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Abstract 
Patient recruitment for clinical trials and studies is a large-scale task. To test a given drug for example, 
it is desirable that as large a pool of suitable candidates is used as possible to support reliable 
assessment of often moderate effects of the drugs. To make such a recruitment campaign successful, it 
is necessary to efficiently target the petitioning of these potential subjects. Because of the necessarily 
large numbers involved in such campaigns, this is a problem that naturally lends itself to the paradigm 
of Grid technology. However the accumulation and linkage of data sets across clinical domain 
boundaries poses challenges due to the sensitivity of the data involved that are atypical of other Grid 
domains. This includes handling the privacy and integrity of data, and importantly the process by 
which data can be collected and used, and ensuring for example that patient involvement and consent is 
dealt with appropriately throughout the clinical trials process. This paper describes a Grid infrastructure 
developed as part of the MRC funded VOTES project (Virtual Organisations for Trials and 
Epidemiological Studies) at the National e-Science Centre in Glasgow that supports these processes 
and the different security requirements specific to this domain. 
 
1. Introduction 
To test new drugs and treatments for clinical 
care requires careful and long-term testing 
before they can be prescribed to the population 
in general. To facilitate such testing requires 
identification and recruitment of large groups 
of the population that fit certain criteria related 
to the specific condition that the drug is 
addressing. 
Automating this process has numerous 
advantages including reduced cost and 
expediting the clinical trials process as whole, 
by avoiding unnecessary contacts with non-
suitable members of the public. An example of 
this is where the recruitment criteria require 
candidates with a cholesterol level between 
certain bands. Such information is not 
typically known by the vast majority of the 
public. Weeding out patients outside of the 
needed bands is therefore beneficial. Over-
recruiting is also advantageous since it may 
well be the case that potential candidates may 
decline to be involved in a given trial, or 
alternatively that certain candidates are better 
matches than others.  
In order to co-ordinate such a trial process 
requires the combined effort of numerous 
personnel with specific roles in the whole 
process: clinical trials investigators and nurses 
wishing to recruit patients for a given trial; 
ethical oversight committee members and 
Caldicott guardians responsible for deciding 
on the ethical aspects of the study; clinicians 
and general practitioners (GPs) responsible for 
individual patients; and importantly the 
patients themselves. Before any access to 
identifying patient data sets is made, it is 
necessary  to obtain patient consent for the use 
of a given patients’ personal and private 
medical data. The interplay between these 
roles and the process by which a clinical trial 
is co-ordinated is crucial to the overall success, 
viability and legality of a trial. 
Given the fact that the clinical data sets are 
typically scattered across many resources and 
institutions, including GP databases, hospitals, 
and disease registries amongst others, Grid 
technology, in principle, provides many 
potential advantages to deal with data 
federation. However, this domain also has 
numerous challenges, especially related to 
security, which must be explicitly addressed.  
Due to the sensitive and confidential nature of 
the data in this domain, strict controls are 
required on access and distribution, with only 
sufficiently privileged actors having the 
appropriate levels of access. 
The VOTES project (Virtual Organisations 
for Trials and Epidemiological Studies) [1] has 
been funded by the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) to explore this problem space. One of 
the focuses of VOTES, and the primary focus 
of this paper, is to develop Grid solutions that 
address large-scale recruitment needs in the 
clinical domain. In addition VOTES is 
addressing two other important areas in the 
support of clinical trials and epidemiological 
studies: data collection and study management. 
Furthermore, it is a requirement that the 
infrastructure that will be developed will be 
effective yet simple to use for the non-Grid 
personnel involved in the clinical trials 
process. 
 
2. Clinical Patient Recruitment 
As described previously, clinical patient 
recruitment is a large-scale and resource-
consuming exercise.  The human challenge in 
co-ordinating such a large effort can be 
immense and in some cases, such as the UK 
Biobank Project [2] the number of potential 
candidates is so large that the use of distributed 
technology is mandatory for the task to be 
completed in a meaningful time-scale. (UK 
Biobank expects to recruit 500,000 members 
of the population between 40-69 years of age). 
 
2.1 Crossing Domain Boundaries 
To effectively identify suitable trial candidates 
on a large a scale requires knowing the 
structure of patient information data sets across 
a broad set of domains. For instance, to sample 
the national population of the UK would 
require knowing the data structures of the 
health services in England and Scotland, 
knowing how they relate to each other and 
knowing how to translate between the schema 
of both.  
Ideally there should be a single electronic 
health record which captures all necessary 
health information associated with a given 
patient that is accessed and updated by all 
health care providers throughout a patients’ 
lifetime. This should support tracking of a 
patients’ place of residence throughout their 
lifetime, and allow for cross checking of 
records in one area to those of the other. 
However such a single e-Health record 
remains a distant wish and a variety of 
heterogeneous and largely non-interoperable 
legacy infrastructures and data sets is the norm 
across the NHS, with paper based patient case 
histories and records still commonly used. 
To support the linkage of distributed data 
sets associated with a given patient, it is 
beneficial to have a common, unique identifier 
for patients that spans all domains and can be 
used to join the patient records between 
databases. In Scotland this unique identifier is 
a number known as the Community Health 
Index (CHI), which is currently being rolled 
out across the nation as part of a new Scottish 
parliamentary initiative. It is planned that the 
CHI number will be rolled out across all of 
Scotland by mid-2006. In England, the unique 
identifier is the NHS Number, which is a 
distinct entity from the CHI. Relating these 
two numbers, which have different structures 
in different contexts, is a major, yet 
unavoidable, challenge.  
 
2.2 Recruitment Work-Flow 
A patient recruitment process must ideally 
capture patient consent as early as possible. 
Whilst information on patients is stored in a 
variety of digital formats and locations, a 
priori consent that these data sets can be 
accessed and queried to decide that a given 
patient be recruited to a clinical trial, is 
needed. One of the best sources of information 
associated with potential trials candidates is 
through primary care sources, i.e. in their GPs 
databases. Understanding whether a given 
clinical trial is in the interest of a particular 
patient is best answered by these GPs.  
   Figure 1 gives a pictorial representation of 
the process/workflow through which a clinical 
trial investigator and a GP might interact to 
support primary care recruitment. 
 
1. The trial co-ordinator wishes to set up a 
new clinical trial, with a specific 
description of the drug/treatment and the 
patients’ characteristics that would 
potentially qualify them for entry into the 
clinical trial. They need to contact a set of 
GPs to describe this new trial and find out 
if these GPs have patients that fit the 
required criteria. 
2. Assuming that the GP is interested in 
participating in this particular trial, they 
need to search their own patient records 
for anyone that may fit these criteria. 
3. Assuming that one or more matching 
patients have been found, the GP decides 
if it is really in the patients’ interest to 
participate in the clinical trial. If this is the 
case then said patient is contacted by the 
GP and told about the trial. If they are 
willing to participate having had the 
potential benefits and issues that might be 
associated with the trial fully explained, 
they are asked for their consent to use 
their personal data for this purpose. Once 
consent is obtained, this information is 
recorded. 
4. Based upon the specifics of the clinical 
trial, various data sets are collected from 
the GPs database. These can be non-
identifying information such as age, 
height, weight, medical conditions and 
social and demographic details. 
Identifying information may be 
anonymised with the de-anonymising keys 
maintained by the GPs.  
5. This information along with the note of 
consent is communicated back to the trial 
co-ordinator. The information is then 
validated and stored for later use in the 
trial. 
 
Figure 1: A diagram of the primary care patient 
recruitment workflow. 
 
One of the central requirements of this process 
is the need to clearly separate the distinct 
duties of the two actors involved. There is 
necessarily a disparity between the privileges 
of the two roles, and the data that they will 
respectively be allowed to access, and at which 
particular times. To enforce this type of 
interdependent and role-based access control 
requires a sophisticated security system. 
 
3. Grid Security for Clinical Trials 
Grid computing depends on the collaboration 
and sharing of resources across domain 
boundaries. A loose coupling of resources and 
user access to achieve a specific goal over a set 
period using Grid technology is often termed a 
Virtual Organisation (VO). 
Traditionally, Grid security has been 
expressed in terms of access control between 
nodes within a VO. In this VO, sites have only 
a limited amount of trust between each other, 
yet they also wish to share certain ring-fenced 
resources that will allow the VO to accomplish 
its overall goal. 
However, enforcing data security in the 
clinical and health-care domain is a more 
complex problem. While the tenets of Grid 
security apply – that of Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting (“AAA”) – 
there are other more subtle requirements that 
must also be met when attempting to set up a 
system that is flexible enough to use Grid 
technologies effectively, but also maintains the 
high standards of privacy and integrity 
required in the clinical domain. A term used to 
describe this particular entity is a Clinical 
Virtual Organisation (CVO). The level of 
prescription of security policies and how they 
are enforced must be strongly adhered to 
within such a CVO. 
 
3.1 Clinical Security Considerations 
Clinical security can be broadly divided into 
the following three areas [3]: 
• Sensitivity 
• Consent 
• HCP (HealthCare Professional) speciality 
Sensitivity relates to the importance and 
privacy level applied to a data field within a 
health-care record. Considering risk analysis, it 
can be described in terms of the possible 
consequences if privacy of this data record is 
broken. The level of sensitivity will ultimately 
be determined by the HCP dealing with the 
particular record, which in turn relates to the 
speciality of that HCP (see below). Where the 
records are being used for statistical 
aggregation of data, a corollary of sensitivity is 
the need for “anonymisation” of that data – 
where any information that identifies a patient 
must be hidden from unprivileged users. 
Consent relates to the requirement of 
asking a patient whether they will allow their 
information to be used in this clinical trial. 
There is a subtlety in obtaining consent as to 
what parts of the patient’s record they will 
release for use and which they wish to remain 
private. To allow this “pick and mix” release 
of consent gives a more flexible structure. 
However, the patient must be guided in this by 
the GP, to provide a professional opinion on 
the consequences of releasing this consent on 
differing parts of their data records, with the 
possibility therein of differing levels of 
sensitivity. 
HCP Speciality refers to the many different 
categories of HCP that can exist. This affects 
access to data records as one HCP may have 
rights to see highly sensitive records in their 
own fields but not in another. This speciality 
will be classified within the security policy 
that defines privileges within the VO. 
Another consideration that is idiosyncratic 
to security within health-care is the scenario 
sometimes called the “broken glass” situation. 
This is where highly sensitive data is accessed 
by an HCP that does not have the necessary 
privileges, in an attempt to save a patient’s life. 
In the immediate situation, the HCP believes it 
necessary to access this record, and time is of 
the essence. The system here is to let the HCP 
have access to this information but have an 
irreversible record that this unprivileged access 
has occurred. When the immediate situation is 
resolved the logs of the event should be 
investigated by an auditing authority, to see 
whether the actions of the HCP were justified.  
 
3.2 Clinical Data Security Policies 
A security policy defined in one site node of a 
VO will not necessarily have the same 
structure as a different node within the same 
VO. This is inherently tied to the structure of 
object classification within a specific domain, 
as security can only be defined and enforced 
on data that itself has a well-defined structure. 
Put another way, sites must have their own 
autonomy and hence define and enforce their 
own security policies on access to different 
data sets.  
There are numerous developments in 
standards for the description of data sets used 
in the clinical domain however. These are 
complex and evolving with numerous 
commercial bodies and standards groups 
involved in developing strategies and include 
major initiatives such as Health-Level 7 (HL7) 
[4], SNOMED-CT [5] and OpenEHR [6]. 
There is often a wide range of legacy data sets 
and naming conventions which impact upon 
standardisation processes and their acceptance. 
The International Statistical Classification of 
Disease and Related Health Problems version 
10 (ICD-10) is used for the recording of 
diseases and health related problems and is 
supported by the World Health Organisation. 
In Scotland ICD-10 is used within the NHS 
along with ICD version 9. ICD-10 was 
introduced in 1993, but the ICD classifications 
themselves have evolved since the 17th 
Century [7]. 
To compound this problem of 
classification, there is the issue of the dynamic 
nature of virtual organisations. One of the 
standard characteristics of a VO is that it is not 
only a loose collaboration between sites but it 
is also a transient one, with a limited lifetime 
and for a specific purpose. As such, any 
security policy enforced will also have a 
limited lifetime – requiring the re-evaluation of 
security requests after a given time period. 
This must be considered when defining 
security policies and establishing chains of 
trust. 
 
3.3 Grid Security Solutions 
Security solutions in the Grid community are 
largely categorised by where they fit into the 
“AAA” scenario. 
Authentication – this is almost always 
achieved using Public Key Infrastructures 
(PKIs) where public and private keys and 
certificates are used to verify the authenticity 
of a user’s identity. 
Authorization – as this is a more 
complicated requirement, in terms of 
establishing privilege rights based on identity, 
there is a wider range of possible solutions in 
the community (PERMIS [8], CAS [9], VOMS 
[10], Akenti [11]). These applications all have 
various advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the needs of the developer and 
the implementation idiosyncrasies, but no clear 
leader has yet been established in the field. In 
the VOTES project, authorization is provided 
by a simple implementation of an Access 
Control Matrix (see section 4.3). 
Auditing – this is a security measure that 
has more relevance later in the production 
cycle of a system. Whilst not underestimating 
the importance of logging all user activity and 
being able to attach events to individuals, 
design and production in the VOTES project is 
currently focused on securing access to the 
system in the first instance and supporting the 
recruitment process. 
 
4. VOTES Implementation 
The details of the portal application that is 
currently under development to provide 
solutions to these security, usability and 
process challenges, are now described in this 
section. 
 
4.1 Grid Technologies 
The implementation of the VOTES project has 
built largely upon the expertise in certain Grid 
technologies based at the National e-Science 
Centre in Glasgow. These include the 
following applications that provide tools to 
develop and maintain the application: 
GridSphere, Globus and OGSA-DAI. 
GridSphere [12] is a web portal technology 
that provides easy access to secure grid 
services. It can be presented as a group of 
layered portlets allowing simultaneous, and 
interactive, task processing. A development 
suite is available that provides easy-to-use 
tools and tutorials for building and deploying 
these portal services. 
The Globus Toolkit [13] similarly provides 
a set of distinct modular tools that allow 
development of Grid services. Version 4.0 of 
the toolkit is implemented in the VOTES 
project, which has been developed to the Web 
Services Resource Framework (WS-RF) 
specification [14] - this is in line with a drive 
by Globus to align their service architecture to 
the more common web services standard [15]. 
OGSA-DAI [16] (Open Grid Services 
Architecture – Data Access and Integration) is 
a project that has developed a toolkit 
specifically for grid services that federate data 
from distributed sources. The OGSA-DAI 
services developed in VOTES again follow the 
WS-RF specification, but this is implemented 
in addition to direct JDBC connections to local 
data sources. The major advantage of using 
OGSA-DAI is that many different data 
sources, from DBM systems to XML and flat 
files, can be queried. The data returned is then 
rendered in a standard XML format, and tools 
are provided to allow easy analysis and 
presentation of this format. 
 
4.2 GPASS and SCI Store 
In the VOTES implementation thus far, the 
development team have been given access to 
relevant software and realistic (representative) 
data sets used to explore the functionality of 
the NHS services and data. Negotiations are 
on-going in rolling out the services described 
in the following sections across the wider NHS 
in Scotland and in gaining access to actual 
clinical data sets 
The General Practice Administration 
System for Scotland (GPASS) [21] is a client-
side application that is in use by a large 
number of general practitioners, in over 890 
practices in Scotland. It provides a portable, 
‘on-the-spot’ electronic interface for GPs to 
input patient data, to be synchronised to the 
centralised SCI-Store [22] repository at such 
times as a connection can be made. It also 
contains a local data store that houses and 
inter-relates information on drugs and 
treatments, thus providing a rudimentary 
ability to advise on a particular treatment, 
depending on patient symptoms and history 
[23]. The interface used to show the electronic 
record of patient history is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A screenshot of the GPASS patient history 
function. 
Because of its proximity to the ‘front-line’ of 
primary care, GPASS is the most pertinent 
technology when looking at patient 
recruitment for clinical trials. The distributed 
and asynchronous structure of the application 
makes the process of integrating this securely 
into a wider system a challenging but 
necessary one. 
The Scottish Care Information (SCI) Store 
[22] is a batch storage system which allows 
hospitals to add a variety of information to be 
shared across the community, e.g. pathology, 
radiology, biochemistry lab results are just 
some of the data that are supported by SCI 
Store. Regular updates to SCI Store are 
provided by the commercial supplier using a 
web services interface. Currently there are 15 
different SCI Stores across Scotland (with 3 
across the Strathclyde region alone). Each of 
these SCI Store versions has their own data 
models (and schemas) based upon the regional 
hospital systems they are supporting. The 
schemas and software itself are still 
undergoing development. 
SCI Store serves as a repository for this 
data across regional and national domains. As 
individual practitioners update their GPASS 
databases, the information is automatically 
uploaded to this central repository. The 
VOTES infrastructure makes use of this by 
developing grid services that allow 
interrogation of the centralised SCI Store 
repository when collecting study data, and also 
allow interrogation of the individual 
practitioner databases for patient recruitment. 
An interface between the grid services already 
developed in VOTES and a test GPASS 
database is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results returned from a query to a local 
installation of GPASS. 
 
The security implications in being able to 
query the individual databases used by GPASS 
are discussed in section 4.4. 
4.3 VOTES Portal 
The central theme of the VOTES project is to 
set up a Clinical Virtual Organisation (CVO) 
that will implement the three-fold vision of 
patient recruitment, data collection and study 
management. 
In the context of primary care patient 
recruitment, the VOTES portal provides web 
access based on the role of either “Trial Co-
ordinator” or “General Practitioner”. (For data 
collection and study management a wider 
range if roles is supported). The grid and data 
services behind the portal provide distributed 
methods of: 
• retrieving the necessary trial, patient and 
GP information. 
• retrieving and storing the trial forms 
• allowing asynchronous communication 
between the co-ordinator and the GP in 
the work-flow (see section 2.2).  
An outline of how these scenarios are 
supported is depicted in the VOTES portal 
infrastructure shown in Figure 5. 
The envisaged future development of the 
VOTES portal includes the addition of 
repeated modules in the overall architecture, 
including extra portal and data servers. (To see 
an outline of the current architecture, see [1].) 
This will allow a more “Grid-like” structure to 
be developed, providing features necessary in 
any production system, such as redundant 
failover, and also features specific to Grid 
technology such as intelligent load-balancing 
and distributed server functionality based on 
the resources available at specific nodes. 
 
4.4 VOTES Security 
NeSC-Glasgow has extensive experience in a 
range of fine-grained authorisation 
infrastructures across a range of application 
domains [17-19]. Whilst it is expected that the 
existing prototype will be moved to a more 
robust authorisation solution, the following 
authorization infrastructure has been 
developed, based on an access matrix as shown 
in Figure 4. This allows for rapid prototyping, 
which allows the problem space to be explored 
and user feedback to be obtained as early as 
possible.  
 
U1(R1 ∆ h3) = 1, U2(R1 ∆ h2) = 0, U3(R3 ∆ h1) = 1, 
U4(R2 ∆ R3 ∆ h4) = 0, 
where ∆ is a combination function, 0, 1 are bit-wise 
privileges, RX, hX are resources and Ux is a subject 
Figure 4: Access Matrix Model 
The authorisation mechanism implements an 
Access Matrix model [20] that specifies bit-
wise privileges of users and their associations 
to data objects within the CVO. Data objects 
are defined as fields, tables, views, databases 
and sites, for the purposes of fine-grained 
authorisation. The access matrix is designed to 
enforce discretionary and role based access 
control policies. It is also scaleable to facilitate 
ease of growth parallel to the predicted growth 
of the infrastructure as a whole.  
The NeSC at Glasgow have already shown in 
numerous other works [27,28] how Grid 
services can be protected through technologies 
such as GSI and PERMIS, however the effort 
in supporting these infrastructures is 
considerable and not conducive to rapid 
prototyping necessary to capture the basic 
functionality needed in clinical trials. Once the 
access matrix model has allowed for the 
detailed expression and enforcement of policy 
which the clinicians and all people involved in 
the clinical trials process are satisfied with, a 
move to a full RBAC model may well be 
considered depending upon the strategic 
direction of the project.  
Security on the data sources is achieved at 
both local and remote level. The local level 
security, managed by each test site, filters and 
validates requests based on local policies at the 
DBMS level. The remote level security is 
achieved by the exchange of access tokens 
between the designated Source of Authority 
(SOA) of each site. These access tokens are 
used to establish remote database connections 
between the sites in the federation. In principle 
local sites authorise their users based on 
delegated remote policies. This is along the 
lines of the CAS model [9]. 
Considering security in GPASS, it is 
probable that due to the distributed nature of 
the application, a modification to the security 
model adopted so far in VOTES will need to 
be made in future development. The 
technology used in VOTES so far, in particular 
the portal’s ability to query and return results 
from the back-end GPASS database, shows 
that it is possible to implement a web/grid 
service interface that provides a handle for 
third parties to securely interrogate GPASS. 
However, until significant progress is made 
between the participating agencies in VOTES, 
it is unlikely that this interface will be adopted 
by the users and developers of GPASS. This is 
part of the human and political factor that must 
be overcome before the technology in VOTES 
will be taken up. In particular it is intended 
that the prototypes will be explored with sets 
of GP practices across the Greater Glasgow 
region through the SPPIRe network [26].  
5. Conclusion 
The prototype application developed in the 
VOTES project is currently a work in progress. 
It does not yet provide all the answers to the 
issues posed in this paper, but it does provide a 
starting place, and is being designed with the 
larger scheme in mind. 
Using the current implementation it is 
possible to envisage a system that will identify 
potential trial candidates quickly, securely and 
efficiently. It is to be hoped that with the use 
of such electronic methods, the scope for error, 
such as mis-identification of patients or release 
of confidential information, will be very much 
reduced. A key aspect of the work is to support 
the capture of patient consent as early as 
possible in the clinical trial recruitment 
process. Scenarios where statistical 
information from GPASS is retrieved where, 
once consent is given through a combination 
of patient and GP interactions, more detailed 
information is returned are under development.  
As with most research that is addressed 
using Grid Computing, only some of the cross-
domain issues are to do with the technology. A 
lot depends on the human and political factors 
between participating bodies. These issues take 
time and the establishment of trust to be 
overcome. However, it is hoped that systems 
such as the one described in this paper will 
allow a closer and more “joined-up” network 
of clinicians and technologists to promote that 
trust and encourage closer collaborative work. 
To support this, it is planned that the 
researchers working on the VOTES project 
will also be given honorary contracts to work 
part time in the NHS in Glasgow. 
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Figure 5: Two views of the recruitment portal. The left image shows the options available in the portal if the role is 
that of the GP. These options are to check the information on the clinical trial, to use GPASS to auto-complete the 
patient information and to notify the trial coordinator that patient information and consent has been obtained. The 
right image shows the coordinator role, which has two options, one to initiate the organisation of the trial and one 
to upload the final data for the patient.
 
 
 
